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Abstract
This paper shows that the following common assumption is false: that 
in modal-logical representations of higher-order vagueness, for there 
to be borderline cases to borderline cases ad infinitum, the number of 
possible distinct modalities in a modal system must be infinite.
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There is a not uncommon misconception regarding the relation be-
tween higher-order vagueness and the number of distinct modalities 
in a modal system. It is this.
(1) For a theory of higher-order vagueness to be useful towards 
the solution of the Sorites (by eliminating any detectable sharp 
boundary between non-borderline and borderline cases), it must 
permit the expression of radical higher-order vagueness, i.e. of bor-
derline borderline … borderline cases, for any number n of it-
erations of ‘borderline’. (2) An object a is borderline F or inde-
terminately F (IFa) precisely if it is not determinately F and not 
determinately not F (~DFa&~D~Fa). (3) If higher-order vague-
ness is expressed by means of axiomatic — or other — systems 
of modal logic, the number of distinct modalities of the system 
must be infinite for it to be possible that there is radical higher-
order vagueness.
In this paper we take issue with (3). (3) is usually rolled out as an ob-
jection to the claim that the modal system KT4 (or S4) may be suit-
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able to represent higher-order vagueness. Here is a recent example:
If S4 (i.e. KT4) is the logic for absolute definiteness then there is only 
a finite number of modalities (in fact at most fourteen distinct modali-
ties, see Chellas 1980, 149). Consequently, there cannot be border-
line cases to borderline cases ad infinitum. (Åkerman and Greenough 
2010: 287, n.37.) 1
Evidently, this objection is not restricted to KT4. A modality is any 
sequence of the operators ~, ◻, ⬨. Two modalities Φ, Ψ are distinct 
if and only if for some A ΦA ↔ ΨA is not a theorem. So, if we confine 
ourselves to familiar systems of normal modal logics and add the fact 
that axiom T seems universally accepted for logics of vagueness, then 
KT and KTB would be prima facie suitable, since either has infinitely 
many distinct modalities. On the other hand, KT4, KT5, KT4G and 
KT4Gc would each be unsuitable for expressing radical higher-order 
vagueness, since the number of their modalities is finite.
Why would anyone think this? Åkerman and Greenough don’t 
give much away in the paper quoted: they seem to imply that for it 
to be possible for there to be borderline cases to borderline cases ad 
infinitum (i.e. radical higher-order vagueness) there need to be infi-
nitely many distinct modalities. Let’s make the plausible assumption 
that this is taken to be so because each order of borderlineness needs 
its own distinct modality, or set of distinct modalities. For there 
to be borderline cases, there needs to be at least one modality; for 
there — also — to be borderline borderline cases, there need to be 
at least two, etc. Why would anyone think this? It is safe to assume 
that the underlying assumption is that for there to be genuine high-
er-order borderline cases, the extension of the borderline borderline 
cases must differ from that of the singly borderline cases, that of the 
triply borderline cases must differ from that of the doubly and the 
singly borderline cases, etc.
In fact, (3) from above indicates a misunderstanding of the nature 
of genuine higher orders in higher-order vagueness. It is a mistake to 
think that the number of distinct modalities in a modal system S lim-
its the number of possible higher orders. More specifically, theorems 
1 This argument is different from the objections against axiom 4 that Wil-
liamson raises (1994: 157-61) and which are followed up by Greenough 2005. 
For some rejoinders to those objections see Bobzien 2012: 194-200, 204-210.
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expressing material equivalence between iterative formulas of differ-
ent ranks2 in a logic of vagueness (e.g. DA ↔ D2A) do not eliminate 
genuine higher orders. Compare epistemic logic. Assume for the 
sake of argument that it is logically true in some epistemic logic that 
I know that A if and only if I know that I know that A. Then I would 
still have genuine second-order knowledge if ‘I know that I know 
that A’ is true. Exactly the same holds for higher orders of vagueness. 
In terms of modalized predicates, if DFx and DnFx are co-extensional 
for any n; or if IFx and InFx are co-extensional for any n, either way, 
this does not preclude that there are a that are genuinely InF. Take, 
for example, an epistemic interpretation of IFa as ‘a is such that one 
can’t tell that it is F and one can’t tell that it is not F’, or, for short, ‘a 
is such that one can’t tell whether it is F’. Assuming compositionality 
(and the mirror axiom IA ↔ I~A), I2Fa then stands for ‘a is such that 
one can’t tell whether one can tell whether it is F’. Even if IFa and 
I2Fa are extensionally equivalent, they clearly express two different 
things. It is one thing for someone to be unable to tell whether Fa, 
and another for someone to be unable to tell whether they are unable 
to tell whether Fa. The same holds for higher orders. In particular if 
a is such that one can’t tell whether one can tell … (indefinite times) 
... whether one can tell whether it is F, then contrary to (3) there is 
radical higher-order vagueness.
It is not necessary to take an epistemic interpretation. Consider 
instead some semantic or ontic interpretation of the indetermina-
cy. For instance, interpret IFa as ‘it is semantically indeterminate 
whether Fa’. Assuming compositionality (and the mirror axiom 
IA ↔ I~A), I2Fa then stands for ‘it is indeterminate whether it is 
indeterminate whether Fa’. Again, even if IFx and I2Fx are exten-
sionally equivalent, they clearly express two different things and 
contrary to (3) there is radical higher-order vagueness.
One purpose of a logic of vagueness (or indeterminacy or bor-
derlineness) is to provide a representation of the — or certain — 
structural properties of vagueness (or indeterminacy or borderline-
ness). There is nothing inherent in the notions of determinacy or 
indeterminacy that prohibits co-extensionality of the determinate 
2 DA is of rank 1, DnA of rank n, etc. For a recent formal definition of modal 
ranks (or modal degrees) see e.g. Carnielli and Pizzi 2009: 27-8.
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and the determinately determinate, or of borderline cases and bor-
derline borderline cases. ([~DFa&~D~Fa] & [~D[~DFa&~D~Fa] 
& ~D~[~DFa&~D~Fa]] is coherent in a system that contains PC, 
MP, N, K and T.) It is perfectly possible to have infinite orders of 
determinacy and of borderlineness with a finite number of distinct 
modalities.3 Note also that it follows from, and for, Williamson’s ac-
count of higher-order vagueness that, if in KT4 some A has second-
order vagueness, it has vagueness at every order (Williamson 1999: 
132-3, 136).4
We conclude by considering two retorts which are sometimes 
voiced. Retort 1: “Agreed, there can be infinite orders of determi-
nacy and borderlineness with a finite number of distinct modalities; 
however, this can be achieved only at the expense of introducing de-
tectable sharp boundaries between determinate cases and borderline 
cases.” One can see how someone might get this idea by examining 
KT5 and KT4 and coming to the conclusion that neither is suitable 
for eliminating sharp boundaries. Given (2) and modal axioms 4 
and 5, KT5 provides, for a vague predicate F, only (i) determinate 
cases of F, (ii) determinate indeterminate cases of F and (iii) deter-
minate cases of ~F. This suggests sharp borders into and out of the 
borderline zone. And Williamson (1999: 134) shows that with his 
own formal characterization of higher-order vagueness, system S5 is 
the weakest extension of KT that would permit vagueness and for-
bid higher-order vagueness. As for KT4, it may appear to lead to a 
3 This holds regardless of whether higher-order vagueness is defined (i) as ‘A is 
nth-order vague if InA (and F is nth-order vague if ∃xInFx)’; or (ii) with Williamson 
(1999: 132) as “[w]e have a first-order classification of states of affairs according 
to whether A or ~A holds. Vagueness in the first-order classification is first-order 
vagueness in A. […] we have an (n+1)th-order classification according to whether 
members of the nth-order classification definitely hold, definitely fail to hold or 
are borderline cases. Vagueness in the nth-order classification is nth-order vague-
ness in A”; or (iii) in any other way directly based on (2).
4 In Williamson’s account (see previous note), ~DDnA&~D~DnA with 
n≥0 is a sufficient condition for (n+1)th order vagueness. By DA ↔ DnA 
for n≥1 in KT4 we get (i) ~DDA&~D~DA→~DDnA&~D~DnA. We get (ii) 
~DDA&~D~DA→~DA&~D~A by the KT4 theorems (iii) DA→DDA and 
(iv) ~D~DA→~D~A: (iii) together with the contraposition of (iv) provides 
DA∨D~A→DDA∨D~DA, which by contraposition and DeMorgan gives (ii). (ii)
covers the case of n=0 and (i) covers the cases with n>0.
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sharp border from the n times determinate cases (DnF) to the n times 
borderline cases (I nF) at the beginning of some assumed borderline 
zone and for indefinite n. However, in both cases the argument is 
not that the extensions of the borderline, and the borderline border-
line, cases, etc., are co-extensive. Rather, for KT5 the argument is 
that there is a sharp boundary between the determinately determinate 
cases and the determinate borderline cases; and for KT4 it would be 
that there is a sharp boundary between the cases that are DnF and the 
borderline cases that are I nF. Thus, even though KT5 and KT4 may 
have been shown to be unsuitable for avoiding a sharp boundary, it 
has not been shown that this is so because the number of their distinct 
modalities is finite. More importantly, system KT4Gc or S4M, which 
adds axiom Gc (◻⬨A → ⬨◻A) to KT4, and which has only a mea-
sly eight distinct modalities, both preserves higher-order vagueness 
and complies with the intuition that there are no detectable sharp 
boundaries between borderline and non-borderline cases. In its de-
terminacy version it has both DA ↔ D2A and IA ↔ I2A as theorems 
and thus introduces infinite orders of both determinacy and indeter-
minacy (or borderlineness). At the same time KT4Gc defines a logic 
of determinacy that has as one of its inherent features that no sharp 
boundary between the borderline cases and the non-borderline cases 
can be determined.5
Retort 2: “By a being borderline F we don’t just mean ~DFa&~D~Fa. 
The borderline cases also have to be between the determinate cases.” 
This is, of course, changing the rules halfway through the game. 
Instead of the standard modal account of borderlineness (2) from 
above, we now have something like this (we offer a charitable ver-
sion), with BLFa for a is borderline F:
(4) BLFa if and only if [~DFa&~D~Fa]&a is between the things 
that satisfy DF and the things that satisfy D~F.
(5)  BL2Fa if and only if [~DBLFa&~D~BLFa]&a is between the 
things that satisfy DBLF and the things that satisfy D~BLF.
5 Bobzien 2010 provides an extended argument for the compatibility of radi-
cal higher-order vagueness with axiom 4 and with the characteristic axiom of 
KT4Gc.
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It is accounts of borderlineness along the lines of (4) and (5) which 
open the door for the so-called higher-order vagueness paradoxes.6 
We believe that such accounts and the ensuing presumed paradoxes 
are the result of a confusion between higher-order vagueness and the 
distribution of the objects of a Sorites series into extensionally non-
overlapping categories.7 But even with (4) and (5), the numbers of 
higher orders do not depend on the numbers of distinct modalities: 
with a sufficiently fine-grained Sorites series nothing prevents there 
from being more than, say, fourteen higher orders. In any event, we 
set out to show that, given (2), (3) is false; i.e. that, given (2), there 
cannot be “borderline cases to borderline cases ad infinitum”, even 
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